U.S. diplomacy in the Kosovo air campaign: strategy, security and international relations
The policy framework pursued by the United States and NATO during the Kosovo war was grounded in a coercive diplomatic strategy aimed at compelling behavioral change in Belgrade, preserving Alliance cohesion, and managing the broader systemic consequences of military intervention in post–Cold War Europe. Central to this approach was the recognition that Slobodan Milošević’s continued rule constituted the principal obstacle to conflict resolution and regional stabilization. Accordingly, U.S. policy consistently treated regime change not as an explicit objective, but as a structurally necessary condition for a sustainable settlement as the most desirable outcome. Diplomatic engagement was thus conceived not as an alternative to force, but as an extension of military pressure. Any credible negotiating process required either Milošević’s removal or his effective marginalization. When talks occurred prior to regime change, they were held outside Yugoslav territory and with interlocutors other than Milošević to deny him political legitimacy while preserving channels capable of achieving NATO’s core demands. Where Belgrade failed to advance a credible position, U.S. policy emphasized intensifying, rather than suspending, coercive pressure. Sustained air strikes were designed to alter the cost–benefit calculations of the Serbian leadership, reflecting lessons from earlier Balkan crises in which pauses in military pressure allowed Belgrade to exploit diplomacy while continuing operations on the ground.